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1  Introduction
The European single currency (Euro), which was launched on January 1, 1999, involves
the following eleven countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
1 These countries form what is now
known as the European Monetary Union (EMU).  As a result, the Euro Area’s monetary
policy is centralized by the European Central Bank (ECB).  The primary policy target of
the ECB is to stabilize the Euro Area’s prices.
2  For the stabilization of prices, the ECB
operates short-term interest rates by facilities and open market operations.  The ECB also
has control over foreign exchange rates and Euro Area’s reserves.
Fiscal policy (another macroeconomic policy) has not been centralized by any
institution,
3 therefore if a member country is confronted with asymmetric shocks, this
country has to solve the problem by its own fiscal policy - however, fiscal policy leaves
budget deficits, which bring the value and credibility of the Euro unstable.
To initiate the EMU, the Euro 11 has made every effort to converge their economies.
Though they succeeded in the convergence to a certain degree, their business cycles are
not parallel to one another.
4  Hence, it is difficult for the ECB and each government to
operate under these policies.
There are several studies on monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU countries.  As for
monetary policy, the political independence of the ECB has been discussed [Grilli et al.
1991, De Grauwe 1997].  On other aspects of the monetary policy, Estrella and Mishkin
[1997] did a comparative study on the term structure of interest rates for the U.S. and
Europe.  Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi [1998] estimated reaction functions of major
EU countries and showed that effects of common monetary policy were different between
each country.  Both Estrella et al. [1997] and Dornbusch et al. [1998] presented interesting
policy implications on the ECB.  For fiscal policy under the EMU, many papers analyzed
whether the EMU needed fiscal federalism [Bayoumi and Masson 1995, Fatás 1998,
Obstfeld and Peri 1998] and the Stability and Growth Pact [De Grauwe 1997, Eichengreen
and Wyplosz 1998].
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1 We call these eleven countries the Euro Area or the Euro 11.
2 The ECB defines stabilizing prices as the HICP(Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices) being lower
than 2% in the medium-term.
3 Though fiscal policy has been decentralized, there is a restriction on the operation of fiscal policy.
This rule is called the Stability and Growth Pact.  In this pact, each EMU member has to maintain its
ratio of budget deficits per GDP under 3%.
4 See The Economist, May 29, 1999, pp. 48-49.2
These previous studies discussed details of monetary or fiscal policy of EMU countries,
however, they did not analyze both monetary and fiscal policies as a whole.  As one of the
papers on macroeconomic policy
5 under the EMU presented, Meade and Weale [1995]
analyzed the policy assignment problem of monetary and fiscal authorities.  It is necessary
for the EMU to implement a well-balanced macroeconomic policy.
6  Though quantitative
analysis of macroeconomic policy must be produced to seek concrete stabilization policies
for the EMU, there are only few empirical analyses on this theme.
In this paper we have constructed an internationally-linked macroeconometric model of
the Euro 11 and estimated their policy reaction functions.  Section 2 defines social welfare
functions and derives at policy reaction functions.  Section 3 explains the structure of the
model.  Section 4 provides a part of the empirical results.  Section 5 discusses simulation
results.  Finally, Section 6 shows certain conclusions.
2  Macroeconomic Policy Objectives
2.1  Social Welfare Function
A social welfare function is a kind of utility function that puts together policy objectives
(e.g. economic growth, inflation, trade balance, etc.).
In this study, social welfare function is defined as a quadratic loss function.  A general
form of quadratic loss function (F) can be written as:
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where wi is weights of policy objective variables, wj is weights of policy instruments, Yi is
policy objective variables,  Yi
*
  is targets of policy objective variables,  Xj  is policy
instruments and Xj
* is targets of policy instruments.
In Equation 2.1, targets and weights of both policy objective variables and policy
instruments are unknown.  The targets of both variables can be obtained by the results of
domestic or international political bargaining, whereas the weights can be estimated
econometrically by using time-series data.
2.2  Policy Reaction Function
A quadratic loss function is a non-linear function that presents a country’s value.
Hence, we cannot directly put this loss function into a simulation model.  In order to
simulate a model by using information of a quadratic loss function, we must derive a
policy reaction function from this loss function, then insert this policy reaction function
into an econometric model.  A policy reaction function can be formulated as a partial
derivative of a quadratic loss function with respect to a policy instrument.  We show an
example of a quadratic loss function that has one policy objective variable and one policy
instrument.  In this case, Equation 2.1 can be rewritten as:
                                                
5 In this paper macroeconomic policy means both monetary and fiscal policies.
6 Meade and Weale [1995] stated that the EMU would collapse unless monetary and fiscal authorities
cooperated carefully.3
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where w1 is a weight of a policy objective variable, wx is a weight of a policy instrument, Y
is a policy objective variable, Y
* is a target of a policy objective variable, X is a policy
instrument and X
* is a target of policy instrument.  We differentiate Equation 2.2 with
respect to a policy instrument (X) to derive at a policy reaction function.  A policy reaction
function can be written as:




Pissarides [1972] and Friedlaender [1973] can be regarded in previous studies.  They
analyzed the British and the U.S. macroeconomic policy respectively.
3  An Overview of the Model
The structure of the model is explained in this section.  The model has two blocks:
macroeconomic and trade linkage.  The macroeconomic block is constructed on the basis
of the Keynesian approach.  Each country’s macroeconomic block is linked through the
trade linkage block.  We adopt the Constant Value Share (CVS) method as trade linkage.
3.1  Macroeconomic Block
The macroeconomic block is constructed by the Keynesian framework.  Our benchmark
model is L. R. Klein’s skeleton model [Klein 1983].  Summation of each final demand




  Zt    : GNP (real)                          Lt    : Employment
  Ct    : Private final consumption (real)         LFt  : Labor force
  It     : Gross fixed capital formation (real)      rt    : Interest rate (nominal)
  EXt  : Exports (real)                        Trt   : Transfer payments (nominal)
  IMt  : Imports (real)                        Yt    : Disposable income (nominal)
  Kt    : Capital stock (real)                   ðt    : Corporate profits (nominal)
  Dt    : Depreciation (real)                   T1t   : Indirect tax (nominal)
  Pt    : Prices                              T2t   : Personal tax (nominal)
  wt    : Wage rate                           T3t   : Corporate tax (nominal)
 Exogenous Variables
  Gt    : Government spending (real)            PMt  : Import prices
  WTt  : World trade transactions (real)          PWt  : World trade price
  Nt    : Population                          MSt  : Money supply (nominal)4
3.1.2  Definitional Equations
Real GNP
(3.1)        t t t t t t Z IM EX G I C = - + + +
The real GNP is explained by this definitional equation.  From the principle of effective
demand, the left side of the gross national expenditure components determines the
production output of a country.
Nominal GNP
(3.2)        rt t t t t t t t t T T T Y D P T Z P - + + = - - 3 2 1
This equation defines the nominal GNP.  By transforming this equation we explain the
nominal disposable personal income.
National Income
(3.3)        rt t t t t t t T T T Y L w - + + = + 3 2 p
Though this is the definitional equation of the national income, the nominal corporate
profits are accounted for by this equation.
Capital Stock
(3.4)        t t t t D I K K - + = -1
The increase of the capital stock of this period equals the gross fixed capital formation
minus the depreciation. The end of last period’s capital stock plus the increase of this
period become the capital stock of this period.
3.1.3  Behavior and Technological Equations
Consumption
(3.5)        ( )   C a P Y a a C t- t t t 1 2 1 0 + + =
We adopt the Brown-type consumption function whose dependent variables are the real
disposable income and the lagged consumption expenditure.
Investment
(3.6)           K b r b Z b b I t- t t t 1 3 2 1 0 + + + =5
The end period’s capital stock and the real GNP explain investments.  In this function
the interest rate is added as one of the explanatory variables because most companies
invest by borrowing.
Export
(3.7)        ( )    EX c P PW c WT c c EX t- t t t t 1 3 2 1 0 + + + =
Fluctuations of trade transactions depend on changes of income and relative prices.  The
more trade partners’ income increase, the more exports increase.  If export prices are
lower than importer’s prices, exports increase.  World trade transactions represent
importers’ income and the world trade prices stand for the other countries’ prices.
Import
(3.8)        ( )   IM d PM P d Z d d IM t- t t t t 1 3 2 1 0 + + + =
The real GNP, the ratio of prices and import prices explain imports.
Employment
(3.9)          L e K e Z e e L   t- t- t t 1 3 1 2 1 0 ln ln ln ln + + + =
In this model, employment is determined by using the production function.
Prices
(3.10)       ( )   2 1 0   PM f Z L w f f P t t t t t + + =
Prices depend on the unit labor cost (markup pricing) and import prices (cost-push
inflation).
Wags
(3.11)       ( ) [ ] t t t t t P g L LF LF g g w ln ln 2 1 0 D + - + = D
The Phillips curve, which explains the relation between the unemployment rate and
inflation, determines wages.
Labor Force
(3.12)       ( ) [ ] ( ) t t t t t t t P w h LF L LF h h N LF 2 1 0 + - + =
The unemployment rate and the real wages explain the labor force.6
Velocity of Circulation of Money
(3.13)       ( )   ln ln 2 1 0   P i r i i MS Z P t t t t t D + + =
The interest rate and inflation explain the velocity of money circulation.  From this
function, the interest rate is determined.
Depreciation
(3.14)         1 0    K j D t- t =
The depreciation is estimated at a certain rate of the last period’s capital stock.
3.1.4  Institutional Equations
Indirect Tax
(3.15)       ( ) t t t Z P k k T 1 0 1 + =
Indirect taxes are explained by the nominal GNP.
Personal Tax
(3.16)         1 0 2   Y l l T t t + =
Personal taxes depend on the nominal disposable personal income.
Corporate Tax
(3.17)          m m T t t p 1 0 3 + =
Corporate profits explain corporate taxes.
Transfer Payments
(3.18)       ( )   2 1 0   w n -L LF n n T t t t rt + + =
In reference to the unemployment insurance, transfer payments depend on
unemployment and wages.
The exchange rate function is not in the Klein’s skeleton model.  In this study we show
the Filatov-Klein exchange rate function.
7  This function is written as:
                                                
7 See De Grauwe and Peeters [1983].7
(3.19)       ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t US t t US t t Z P Bal o r r o P P o o e 3 , 2 , 1 0 ln ln + - + + =
where PUS,t is the prices of the US, rUS,t is the nominal US interest rate and Balt is the
current account.
The Filatov-Klein model explains the exchange rate by relative prices between the host
country and the US, the interest rate differences and the nominal current account per the
nominal GNP.  The exchange rate is basically determined by the purchasing power parity.
Its short-term fluctuation depends on the interest rate differences and the current account.
3.2  Trade Linkage Block
General macroeconometric models treat export and import prices that are determined by
foreign economies as exogenous variables.  However, these variables can become
endogenous variables by adding a trade linkage model to a macroeconometric model.  In
this study, we use the constant value share (CVS) method as a trade linkage model.  This
method assumes the nominal trade matrix to be constant through the timeframe of a
simulation.  Nominal import and export prices are transferred to the trade linkage block,
then nominal export and import prices are returned to the macroeconomic block via the
nominal trade matrix.  The CVS model can be written as:
(3.20)       i ij ij ij PX XV V EX =
(3.21)       ￿ =
i
ij j EX IM
(3.22)       j ij ij IM EX A =
(3.23)       ￿ =
i
i ij j PX A PM
(3.24)       ￿ =
j
ij i EX EX
where PXi is export prices of the ith country, EXij is real export of the ith country to the jth
country, Vij is nominal trade share from the ith country to the jth country, XVj is nominal
import of the jth country, IMj is real import of the jth country, Aij is real trade share from
the ith country to the jth country, PMj is import prices of the jth country and EXi is export
of the ith country.  This model supposes that nominal trade share (V) is fixed.  Hence real
trade share (A) is changeable.
I.  Empirical Results
Section 4 shows estimation results of policy reaction functions of monetary and fiscal
authorities.  All equations are estimated by ordinary least squares.  Please note: Adj. R
2 is8
the corrected R square, S. E. is the standard error, D. W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Upper and lower parentheses indicate t-statistic and p-value respectively.
4.1  Policy Reaction Function of Monetary Authority
The most important target of monetary policy is the stabilization of prices.  Hence, one
of the policy objective variables of monetary policy is the inflation rate.  In this model, the
inflation rate is normalized by the set target.  We set the inflation rate target at 1% per
annum.
Germany
(4.1)      RMMGER = 0.31874
                    (1.505134)
                     [0.1465]
                   +0.32185*((GR4_PC91GER-GR4_PC91GER
*)/ GR4_PC91GER
*)
                    (3.572103)
                    [0.0017]
                   + 0.20033114*(@SEAS(1)) - 1.410186511e-05*(@SEAS(2))
                    (1.319743)               (-9.28E-05)
                     [0.2005]                [0.9999]
                   - 0.01768676226*(@SEAS(3)) + 0.8014599283*RMMGER-1
                    (-0.116466)                (14.58430)
                     [0.9083]                  [0.0000]
  Adj. R
2 = 0.985105   S.E. = 0.283776   D. W. = 0.878629   Sample: 1991:3-1998:2
The money market rate of Germany (RMMGER) is explained by the normalized
inflation rate from the previous four quarters by its inflation target ((GR4_PC91GER -
GR4_PC91GER
*) / GR4_PC91GER
*), dummy variables for the first, second and third
seasons (@SEAS(1), @SEAS(2), @SEAS(3))
8 and the lagged money market rate.  This
reaction function is statistically well-estimated aside from the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Ireland
(4.2)      RMMIRE = 3.24458
                   (3.264563)
                    [0.0085]
                  + 0.64425*((GR_PC90IRE - GR_PC90IRE
*) / GR_PC90IRE
*)
                   (1.674266)
                   [0.1250]
                  + 0.48675*RMMGBR
                   (3.552801)
                    [0.0052]
                                                
8 Data of Germany is not seasonally adjusted.  Hence we need seasonal dummy variables to estimate
equations of Germany.9
  Adj. R
2 = 0.773484   S.E. = 1.134877   D. W. = 2.490554   Sample: 1985-1997
The normalized inflation rate by its inflation target ((GR_PC90IRE - GR_PC90IRE
*) /
GR_PC90IRE
*) and the money market rate of Great Britain (RMMGBR) determine the
Irish money market rate (RMMIRE).  Though a general estimate could be obtained, there
are several problems.  The degree of freedom does not reach its appropriate number.  The
normalized inflation rate is rejected at the 5% significant level.  The corrected R square is
lower than that of Germany’s.  These problems can be overcome by using more data in the
estimation.
4.2  Policy Reaction Function of Fiscal Authority
We suppose that one of the targets of fiscal authority is economic growth.  The policy
objective variable is the real GDP or the unemployment rate.
Germany
(4.3)      G91GER = 154692.9747 + 3021.97701*URGER - 24475.05402*(@SEAS(1))
                   (40.62179)    (6.451464)          (-12.49055)
                    [0.0000]      [0.0000]            [0.0000]
                  - 13996.31839*(@SEAS(2)) - 13446.52471*(@SEAS(3))
                   (-7.301022)              (-7.031567)
                    [0.0000]                 [0.0000]
  Adj. R
2 = 0.845613   S.E. = 3824.599   D. W. = 0.704050   Sample: 1990:3-1998:2
German government spending (G91GER) depends on its unemployment rate (URGER)
and seasonal dummy variables.  Though most statistics show good results, we can
recognize a serial correlation with the Durbin-Watson statistic.
Ireland
(4.4)      CG90IRE = 762.74205 + 0.01428*GDP90IRE
                    (2.415959)  (2.300899)
                     [0.0265]    [0.0336]
                  + 0.74259*CG90IRE(-1)
                    (7.183836)
                     [0.0000]
  Adj. R
2 = 0.906916   S.E. = 117.2200   D. W. = 1.291164   Sample: 1976-1996
We can explain Irish government consumption by the real Irish GDP (GDP90IRE) and
the lagged Irish government consumption.  Judging from this statistic, the reaction
function is well-estimated.10
5  Simulation Results
Simulation results are presented in this section.  The simulation time period is 1995-
2000.  We have provided Germany and Ireland’s simulation results.
5.1  Assumptions on Exogenous Variables
There are two types of exogenous variables in this model.  One is the variable that
increases with time.  As for this type of exogenous variables, we calculated its growth rate
and extended it by the growth rate.  The other is the fluctuation which does not have any
relation to time.  With regard to these exogenous variables, their averages were used for
input.
5.2  Scenario Simulations
We prepared two scenarios for this simulation analysis.
Scenario 1: Business As Usual (BAU) Scenario
We simulated the model from 19995 to 2000 without any consideration to policy
instruments.  Monetary and fiscal policy variables are determined by each policy reaction
function in the BAU scenario.
Scenario 2: Common Monetary Policy (CMP) Scenario
We examined the effects of adopting the common money market rate in Scenario 2.  The
common interest rate that is operated by the ECB is computed as the weighted average of
the Euro Area’s eleven money market rates.  The money market rate of the ECB is
formulated as:
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where rECB,t is the money market rate of the ECB, wit is the weight of the ith country, rit is
the money market rate of the ith country, Zit is the real GDP of the ith country and eit is the
exchange rate of the ith country.  Each country’s weight is assumed as its country’s real
GDP (in US dollar) per the Euro Area’s real GDP (in US dollar).  We applied the ECB’s
common monetary policy from 1998 to 2000, meaning that the Euro 11 has the same
money market rate for those years.
5.3  Results
Money Market Rate
Figure 1 shows the money market rate of Germany for scenarios 1 and 2.  The BAU
scenario result implicates a decrease to 1.36% of the money market rate in the fourth11
quarter of 1998, then an increase to the level of roughly 2.5%.  The ECB’s money market
rate will be an approximate 3.67% from 1998 to 2000.  As a result of being a member of
the EMU, the money market rate of Germany will be higher than its fundamental rate.
The money market rate of Ireland is presented in Figure 2.  Ireland’s money market rate
from 1998 to 2000 is forecasted as roughly 7%.  The difference between scenarios 1 and 2
is over 3%.  Ireland’s economy is growing faster than that of the major Euro Area’s
members’.  Though Ireland needs to slow down its economy by increasing its interest
rates, the common interest rate will prove to be lower than expected.
Economic Growth
Economic growth rates of Germany and Ireland are provided in Table 1.  The economic
growth rate of Germany from the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 2000 is
approximately 0.3%.  Though the growth rate from the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth
quarter of 1997 is roughly 0.3%, it is expected to be 0.1% from the first quarter of 1998 to
the fourth quarter of 2000.
Ireland’s economy will grow at the rate of 7% from 1991 to 2000.  In contrast to
Germany, Ireland’s growth rate from 1998 to 2000 is higher than from 1991 to 1997.  The
difference in timeframe is 0.3%.
This is due to the implementation of the ECB’s common interest rate.
Inflation Rate
Table 2 presents inflation rates of both Germany and Ireland.  Germany’s consumer
prices will increase at 0.6% from the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 2000.  In
detail, it will grow at the rate of 0.7% from the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of
1997, and at 0.4% from the first quarter of 1998 to the fourth quarter of 2000.  The ECB’s
interest rate will decrease the inflation rate at roughly 0.4 points.
The inflation rate of Ireland is approximately 3%.  On the contrary, the inflation rate
from 1998 to 2000 is expected to be 2%, the difference between scenarios 1 and 2 being
roughly 0.4 points.  The ECB’s monetary policy will increase Ireland’s consumer prices at
0.4%.
6  Concluding Remarks
In this paper we constructed an internationally-linked model of the Euro 11 and
evaluated the effects of the common monetary policy.  The forecasted results show that the
ECB’s money market rate will be at approximately 3.6% from 1998 to 2000.  Quantitative
effects of the common monetary policy will not be great, however, directional effects will
differ in each country due to differences in their business cycles.  It is difficult for the ECB
to improvise successful operations of the monetary policy while recognizing the overall
fundamentals pertaining to the Euro 11.12
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